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Abstract: The government took Apple to court to demand decryption of a terrorist cell phone. The warrant issued
rested on the assumption that law enforcement should be able to do its work through extension of “access” across
the population of encrypted iphones. Each phone exists as a defeasible (Rescher 1977) site whose cooperation
(access) is assumed to be opened by the the manufacturer if directed to do so by government, unless cause can be
shown otherwise. Defeasible argument couples rhetorically with metonymic force as a powerful argument trajectory.
The reversal of burden of proof, now placed on the company to defend its encryption, permits the government to
extend the scope of its power by turning cell phone companies into its helpers. This is the manner in which a
government would "commandeer innocent third parties into becoming its undercover agents, its spies, or its hackers"
(Goldman & Segall 2016). The test case was crucial for Apple, but it was resolved by the discovery of a third-party
who could gather the information without the manufacturers complicity.

1. The dark problem
The twenty-first century communications revolutions generates expanding experiments,
particularly at the next where the law has to grow to catch up with social activities. The law is a
conservative institution that lags behind yet remains vulnerable too changes in the public
practices. Airlines, railroads, telegraph services coupled with mining, forestry, agriculture and
fishing to produce modern prosperity. Modern revolution also generated new challenges to adapt
international, national, and local legal institutions to the web of complications attended to legal
intervention when things go criminally or contractually amiss. So, too, with the cybersphere
expands challenge to the police powers of the state.
Unfortunately, those who commit crimes have not missed the information
revolution. Criminals use mobile phones, laptop computers, and network servers
in the course of committing their crimes. In some cases, computers provide the
means of committing crime. For example, the Internet can be used to deliver a
death threat via email; to launch hacker attacks against a vulnerable computer
network, to disseminate computer viruses, or to transmit images of child
pornography. In other cases, computers merely serve as convenient storage
devices for evidence of crime. For example, a drug dealer might keep a list of
who owes him money in a file stored in his desktop computer at home, or a
money laundering operation might retain false financial records in a file on a
network server. Indeed, virtually every class of crime can involve some form of
digital evidence. (Hagan & Judish 1979)
Communication networks organization argument activities that depend upon an ostensible open
system of exchange but that is actually drawn around of a series of borders through which
property becomes defined and useful security is achieved. The interests of the legal system is in
the capacity of network logs, email, word processing files and image files to “provide the
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government with important (sometimes essential) evidence in a criminal case” (Hagan & Judish
1979).
Shadow networks accompany all forms of human empire. Neo-liberal America is no
exception. James Scott (1985, 1990) identifies “weapons of the weak” as a practice that depends
upon challenging public transcripts with anonymous, ambiguous, seemingly passive but
aggressive acts of disruption, vandalism and disturbance. The highway man was a romantic
figure, escaping the constraints of industrialism and domestic life. So, too, the mysteries of
criminal concealment and shadow populations renew themselves in an Internet world. The dark
web is a term used to refer that are hidden deepen among web connections. These are constituted
by friend-to-friend networks and popular services such as Freenet, I2P, and To (Dark
Web…n.d.) The Silk Road offered an infamous case where subterfuge was underway with
illegal drug dispersal. In the police discipline, the Internet is imagined as a space to conspire,
hide secrets, and assemble plots. Jamie Bar (2014) described the dark net as an undergrounded
constituted by subcultures that included “social media racists, cam girls, self-harm communities,
drug markets, cryptoanarchists and transhumanists.”
2. Surveillance society
Into the mix of suspicion about activities of criminals and hiddenness of evidence comes entered
the institutional momentum of surveillance and communications control of the Patriot Act. The
public was unaware of precisely how much Congress had capitulated to fears of terrorism. Media
companies were reluctant to let their customers know about private media surveillance and data
sales of behavior. The same media companies were even more reserved about giving up their
complicity with government orders for data. James Clapper the head of the National Intelligence
for the National Security Agency (NSA) that had just finished a massive phone sweep operation
on U.S. Cellular and Verizon was asked by Sen. Ron Wyden directly at a March 12, 2013
hearing: “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of
Americans?” Clapper’s answer: “No Sir.” (Kessler 2013). Of course, the Senate had been
informed of data capture programs had been going on since 2007. The protections were
rationalized by claims that courts are involved in special cases, even though FISA courts are
secret and turned down not so much as a single request; further, the information is described as
metadata which makes it sounds harmless in the particular case—which of course it may be, until
back traced to the source from which it’s taken. Shortly to follow were the Snowdown leaks. It
was revealed that the NSA was “harvesting millions of email and instant messaging contact lists,
searching email content, tracking and mapping the location of cell phones. Snowden’s leaks were
not the last (England 2014). Credit card hacking soon followed as popular sport. The Panama
papers were thrilling enough for a hundred journalists to keep secret and the story ripen for a
year.
3. Fictions of presence & legitimation controversy
The communications industry in the United States plays a tricky game.
Ever since Edward Snowden released a mountain of information about the extent
of U.S. government secret surveillance, the battle has been growing between tech
companies and the government over access to data… Apple, Google, Microsoft
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and others to lock down, or encrypt, data on smartphones and digital devices.
(Woodruff 2015)
Encryption protects clientele. Perception of security are core to maintain the legitimacy of digital
activities. The whole simulated apparatus works to the extent that users make a defeasible
judgment. The absence of social presence is discounted by the assumption that intrusions by
surveillance apparatus of business, government and others doesn’t really make a difference. A
more sophisticated judgment locates the lack of presence as possibly mattering, but its problems
are subject to correction, once lack of actual presence of an other matters. In this context, efforts
to guard privacy through encryption devices are key to maintaining the legitimacy of the whole
normalized operation. Those comfortable with a digital augmentation of their lifeworld in the
first place can remain comfortable, ever more dependent, upon the apparatus without worry—
because there is no technological means of intrusion. The technical assurance of privacy is key to
the legitimacy of the communications industry.
The interests of the state and industry are stressed to the breaking point when it comes to
cybersecurity. The efforts of the state to put on access and control devices goes as far back as
Clipper Ship technologies. Even with repeated efforts to whip of fears of Chinese and Russian
sponsored hack operations, business has been reluctant to subject its projects to machine control.
The government is granted access to stored data in sets of not well-publicized rules.
4. Defeasible phones & the politics of encryption
Into the mix of appearance and illusion, things noticeable and not, plopped the cell phone of a
San Bernardino terrorist. There are events that explode over the front page, bringing together a
clash of people, agencies, and publics at a particular location. The volatility of the cases,
themselves, render the discourse of interest to expert and lay publics alike. Network
argumentation becomes exposed when a case erupts that forces to strive to capture and work
toward personal, institutional, and public ends. The case concerned the partially destroyed
iPhone used by Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik who murdered 14 at a holiday
luncheon. The government inserted then withdrew litigation against Apple. The arguments
asserted the need to have the phone opened in order to achieve access to potential evidence.
Apple had built the encryption coding device, so it was assumed that it could and should reverse
engineer the code in order to get into the phone, without efforts that would destroy the
information secured within.
Solving a “dark problem” was desirable for evidence-hungry investigators; however the
politics of control are quite another for the public. In a networked world, however, an individual
phone traffics metonymically in the orbits personal and national security concerns. PBS
discussed the politics of encryption.
DAVID SANGER: And that’s why, to borrow your iPhone here, this is a
national security problem in your pocket, and in everybody’s pocket. So, for 99.9
percent of communications, the government wants you to encrypt more, because
they don’t want criminals to be able to get into your bank account. Your whole
life is on this phone, right?
WILLIAM BRANGHAM: Right.
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DAVID SANGER: Everything, medical data, financial data, conversations back
and forth with family members.
And they’re protected by that four-digit code you type in, which in turn creates a
much longer encryption key. So, the question is, who gets to hold on to that key?
And Apple said, we don’t want it. We want you to have your own key. Well, the
problem…
WILLIAM BRANGHAM: We being the individual user.
DAVID SANGER: The individual.
So, if the FBI wanted your data, or the NSA wanted to go in and get it because
they thought you were communicating with a terrorist [the dark problem], what
Apple is saying, don’t bring that warrant to us. Go give it to William, and have
him give you the key. Well, of course, the FBI’s view is, drug dealers, terrorists,
they’re not likely to turn over a key. (PBS 2015)
The argument for government access turned on a technical rule, however, not public
demand. The United States federal statute, The All Writs Act 28 U.S.C. ѯ 1651 furnished the
basis of arguing that private actors should be compelled to serve investigative evidence of the
state—even when no longer attached to a property. The original form of the law was the
Judiciary Act of 1789. It was modernized in 1989. The Supreme Court authorized The All Writs
Act 28 U.S.C. ѯ 1651 authorizes the United States federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” The act in its original form was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The modern form of the
act was first passed in 1911 “and the act has been amended several times since then, but it has
not changed significantly in substance since 1789” (All Writs Act, n.d.). A writ was acceptable if
it met 4 tests: there were no alternative remedies, that it was offered in an established
jurisdiction, that it was necessary or fitting for the case at hand, and overall agreeable to the
usages and principles of the law. In particular, “the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
New York Telephone Co. (1977) that the act provided authority for a U.S. District Court to order
a telephone company to assist law enforcement officials in installing a device on a rotary phone
in order to track the phone numbers dialed on that phone, which was reasonably believed to be
used in furtherance of criminal activity” (All Writs Act, n.d.).
The logic of the federal case was hooked into defeasible reasoning; that is the
company should provide access unless they can show cause as to why the apparatus does not
meet the conditions of a legitimate writ. The position is something like a decree nisi, a
condition set up for a ruling upon a condition that a rule applies unless a fact arises that
would otherwise obstruct it. A rule nisi (unless) is a court order “that does not have any force
unless a particular condition is met—“typically, the condition is that an adversely affected
party fail to provide satisfactory evidence or argument that the decree should not take effect”
(Decree nisi, n.d.). Apple did not concede the case because the concession would shift
presumption and burden of proof to the manufacturers who were interested primarily in
controlling their own access to their data. Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier’s
Foundation supported Apple by posing the paradox. “A proposal to protect our security by
weakening our security is going in the wrong direction,” she claimed. “If the government
were to suggest that no one put locks on their doors because if we were a terrorist it would be
harder to get into our house, we would think that was a bad idea.” “This is pretty much the
digital equivalent of that,” she maintained (Mello 2015).
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5. Conclusion: liberty & control
Apple put up a fight because IF IT HAD BEEN conceded that the corporation had an
obligation to undo its own security systems, then in cases where there is prosecutorial
interest it would face a series of undoing security codes—passing along government and
private surveillance opportunities part to part to part. Cell phones were aligned in metonymic
array carrying the stamp of open, constant surveillance possibilities by private corporations
directed by state agencies, first in the United States then likely around the globe. The naming
process used in the court identified millions of phones as the need for “access” in order to
fulfill the obligation of a “warrant” justified by setting up the defeasible condition.
Metonymic reasoning was capped by reducing to absurdity the condition. The logic of
government access to phones mandating that locks be compromised is similar to government
access to homes mandating that locks be removed—all in the name of security that protects
from rare or imagined (imminent as anticipated at some point) terrorist invasions. The
government found third source to gain the information. The argument remains. The Internet
renders material objects that set sights for communication and means to connect subject to
metonymic chaining, whether authorized by the open and hidden measures of the state or
smuggled into dark, vast hidden communities of practice.
There are several implications of the paper by Mauer and Mauer. The rhetorical force
of defeasible argument needs to be understood, particularly as systems of control scrape
away protections to liberty. Defeasible is only understood incompletely when transferred
from a form of reasoning to an instrument of argumentation. Institutions that deploy
defeasible reasoning to anticipate and discount arguments need to be held to close
accountability by the populations they purport to serve. The burden of showing cause to
defeat the rule figures rhetorically into constructions of identity and the performance of
getting counted. Is metonymy the only, chief, or just one of many tropes that animates
defeasible security argumentation apparatus? Second, the Internet is a vehicle for the
announcement, coordination, and publicity of activities that seem to be open. The net is far
from that, particularly as clouds digitize vast numbers of words, things, and information.
Routine filters contribute to a naïve confidence in the range of non-private activities and
negative performances that it hosts. The exploration of efforts to connect actors who prefer to
remain hidden, remote, anonymous remind us that “natural language” analysis is by
definition based upon highly artificial systems of visibility, search, and disclosure. Third,
Enlightenment values such as freedom, privacy, liberty are conflicted with neo-liberal
practices that front libertarian entrepreneurial rhetorics with systems of appropriation,
control, and isolating filters. Critical argument inquiry of the practices of apparently innocent
informal logic invite candid appraisal and analysis. We owe a debt of gratitude to Lauer and
Lauer for bringing these things to our attention.
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